

MOZAMBIQUE REVOLUTION



tete, October 1969

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mozambique liberation front

M O Z A M B I Q U E R E V O L U T I O N

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ditorial

Contradictions are inevitable in any liberation movement engaged in a protracted armed struggle. They are particularly inevitable when that movement has already defined a clear ideology, and even more so when that ideology is a revolutionary one. Without this definition it is always possible to conceal contradictions beneath the cover of "differences of opinion". But when a clear and inflexible revolutionary ideology has been drawn up and there are militant comrades to ensure that it is followed, then contradictions are inevitable.

This is the lesson we have learned over seven years. We started with a heterogeneous group of people remotely linked by the idea of independence and the philosophy of "nationalism". This idea was not present with the same intensity in all of us and varied in substance. As the Chief of the Army in his message to the fighters on the occasion of 25 September said:

"We come from a society where the mentality of the colonialists dominated. We came to the revolution loaded with vices and defects. Some Mozambicans came to the revolution led by ambition, in order to have high positions in an independent Mozambique. Others came because the Portuguese did not allow them to freely exploit the work of their fellow-Mozambicans. The Portuguese wanted to be the only people to exploit. So these people came to the revolution to expel the Portuguese and take their place in the exploitation of the people... These Mozambicans came to the revolution with this spirit. And when they saw that the revolution does not allow the satisfaction of their personal interests, that responsibilities are given in accordance with the abilities of each person, that exploitation is completely banned, that discipline is strict and rigid - when they saw all this, these Mozambicans start vacil-

lating, they formed groups of discontents, ready to act against the truly revolutionary forces as soon as the first opportunity appeared. And when the enemy agents arrived and started looking for elements to organise against the revolutionary leadership of FRELIMO, they found a fertile field among these discontents. This is the explanation of the difficulties that FRELIMO has had to face during the last two years: contradictions even at the top level of FRELIMO..."

Thus, at the beginning we had no ideological line: it was impossible to formulate an ideology broad enough to encompass all the different tendencies represented by the various social, political, economic, religious, cultural groups. The idea of independence and nationalism was the only thing they had in common - and in the beginning this seemed sufficient to ensure the struggle's advance. But with the evolution of the struggle there developed a new situation. We started having liberated regions; we had to plan the work of national reconstruction - production schools, hospitals.

This gave rise to certain problems: How to structure the economy in the liberated zones? How to organise the school services, the hospitals? Should we copy the colonialist - capitalist model which had just been removed, or should we adopt a system based on the needs and will of the people? The contradictions now came to the surface. Those who had come to the revolution to become wealthy, motivated by their personal interest, wanted the system to remain the same - we should just expel the colonialists, reestablish the structures created by the Portuguese, and take their place in the positions of control. The revolutionary comrades took a diametrically opposed position. They knew that if this happened there was no justification for the struggle. Why fight if everything will continue as before? They wanted a completely different system where all the vestiges of colonialist and capitalist influence would be eliminated. They wanted a system that would really serve the interests of the people and which could never resemble, not even vaguely, the system of the exploiters and oppressors.

After this, the division became more acute. A struggle began, between the groups representing the two lines. And all the problems, all the difficulties we have had since then are the result of this division.

But it was not admitted and openly discussed until the last meeting of the Central Committee. In that meeting we finally identified the existence of two ideological lines. The elements opposed to the interests of the people, the corrupt, the opportunistic, were unmasked and criticised. Those who had made themselves completely unacceptable to the revolution were expelled. Those who indicated regret for their activities and for whom there seemed even the faintest possibility of reintegration were not expelled for it was believed that there should be a unifying spirit in the movement strong enough to lead misguided comrades, through education and discussion, back to the true revolutionary path. Some who were known to have taken part in subversive activities were disciplined and removed from their posts of responsibility, while others were severely criticised and subsequently promised to follow closely the policies laid down by the Second Congress.

At the end of that meeting of the Central Committee, we declared that a certain unity had been achieved. But we had certain reservations that "we do not deceive ourselves with the hope of an easy path". And indeed, shortly afterwards, several of these people showed their true colours by deserting and running away to the Portuguese, thus proving what the true militants were already well aware of - that Position meant more to them than the Revolution. We knew that some one who is basically ambitious, opportunist, exploiter, does not automatically correct himself by the mere fact of saying that he recognises his errors. That same idea was stressed in the message of the Chief of the Army mentioned above:-

"This does not mean that all the counter-revolutionary elements that we have characterised have been neutralised completely. No, the struggle in our midst continues. It is a long and difficult struggle, almost interminable which must start with ourselves because the vices we brought from the colonial society will not disappear if we do not fight strongly, if we do not try to correct ourselves at every step within a revolutionary perspective".

Thus, the contradictions did not finish. Certain elements of FRELIMO, even with positions of responsibility, continue to desert the struggle inventing varied justifications. They give themselves up to the enemy, they choose to live as simple refugees, they try to form parties following the line that they preach. Others will presumably desert in the future:

as long as the struggle is being fought, desertions will not stop. And even after independence: the example of certain independent-African countries shows us that when a truly popular ideology is adopted and implemented, the reactionary elements cannot conform and run away - they "ask protection" from the capitalists, their spiritual mentors. Thus, to those that say that the desertions in FRELIMO mean that there is a crisis, we answer: No, there is no crisis. These are contradictions which are solved by the struggle itself: the revolution itself ensures the rejection of the impure load it carries.

we are freedom

Let us follow the path that today is ours.
With guns, we shall march to build the world we want.

The boundaries of our free land are widening.
Our fields
Our schools
Our hospitals are growing
With each passing day the darkness of oppression
Recedes before the light of our hopes.

The image of our victory rises clear
From our collective labour
It has already the beauty of revolution.

All the land will be ours
The world will be ours
We are freedom, comrade.

Marcelino dos Santos

COMMUNIQUE

OF THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

The Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO), informs that, by decision of its Executive Committee, comrade Uria T. Simango is suspended from membership of the Council of Presidency of FRELIMO until the next meeting of the Central Committee, to which his case will be referred for final consideration.

The following is the text of the resolution of the Executive Committee:

"The Executive Committee of FRELIMO, meeting in Dar es Salaam on 8 November, 1969 in order to assess the situation created by the publication by comrade Uria T. Simango of a pamphlet entitled "Gloomy Situation in FRELIMO":

1. Deeply deplores that comrade Uria T. Simango member of the Council of Presidency of FRELIMO, has refused to present his problems within the framework of the structures and institutions of FRELIMO, preferring to do this through the press.
2. Condemns this attitude of comrade Uria T. Simango, which is extremely irresponsible, violates the principles and the rules of FRELIMO and constitutes a grave act of indiscipline.
3. Notes with deep indignation that the contents of the pamphlet are a body of calumnious accusations, of insults and of falsities, aimed at denigrating the leaders of FRELIMO who are truly nationalists, patriots and revolutionaries. Indeed, the pamphlet constitutes an insult to the Mozambican people, to FRELIMO and to the revolutionary armed struggle of national liberation being waged in our country. It is inspired by the personal ambition of comrade Uria T. Simango and serves only the interests of Portuguese colonialism and imperialism.
4. Rejects categorically, formally and totally the contents of the pamphlet "Gloomy Situation in FRELIMO", published by comrade Uria T. Simango.
5. Condemns comrade Uria T. Simango for all the declarations contained in the pamphlet, which constitute an act against the unity of the Mozambican people, against FRELIMO and against the progress of the revolutionary armed struggle in Mozambique, and consequently against the whole

of Africa.

6. Decides to suspend comrade Uria T. Simango from membership of the Council of Presidency of FRELIMO until the next meeting of the Central Committee to which the case will be referred for final consideration.

7. Reaffirms the unwavering determination of the Mozambican people, of the fighters and of the leadership of FRELIMO to continue relentlessly all efforts to preserve and consolidate the unity of FRELIMO and of the Mozambican people, to assure the continuation of the revolutionary armed struggle for national liberation, until final victory.

Resolution on the Armed Struggle
from FRELIMO Second Congress, 20-25 July, 1968

"....

5. The phenomenon of desertion is not a specific characteristic of the struggle for liberation of Mozambique. There are desertions in most countries, even in the absence of war.

In the movement for National Liberation of Mozambique, desertions have many causes.

Many comrades are engaged in the struggle because they really have a nationalist, political conscience. But there are some whose national feeling is very weak. There are others who, after committing transgressions, fear punishment by the Portuguese authorities. Then, to escape punishment, they engage themselves in the nationalist movement. Persons with such a behaviour often fail; they are unable to withstand the difficult guerrilla's life, and they can hardly acquire nationalist, political conscience. So they desert. And once out of the movement, they give themselves to inventing excuses to justify themselves. Some spread every kind of rumour in order to discredit the leaders, divorce them from the masses, and disintegrate the struggle. Others give themselves up to the Portuguese. Desertions are grave crimes. Desertors are enemies of the Mozambican people...."

(Documents of the Second Congress,
page 34, July 1968)

Communique

It seems to have become very fashionable these days for correspondents and political commentators to write very pessimistically about FRELIMO, that since the death of Comrade Mondlane and certain defections, the movement is slowly crumbling through disorganisation and demoralisation. They seem to forget that FRELIMO is firmly established on the complete and popular support and participation of the masses of the Mozambican people, and thus the disappearance from the scene of particular individuals can in no way effect the development of the struggle. FRELIMO is guided by a collective leadership of the elected representatives of the people, comprising the Central Committee. And when a comrade cannot live up to his revolutionary responsibilities, and betrays the responsibilities entrusted to him by the people, this in fact can do the organisation nothing but good, for it removes the weak link in the chain, to be replaced by a truly strong and revolutionary one. Moreover, the only way to assess the true progress of our struggle is to look to the theatre of action. Recent events at the battle-front should leave no one in doubt. For example, in Cabo Delgado alone,

In a little over two months - from August 7 to October 21, - our fighters were engaged in no less than 33 successful operations killing 167 Portuguese soldiers and destroying 31 military vehicles.

1. There were 24 mine explosions which killed 107 Portuguese soldiers and destroyed or damaged 30 military vehicles.
2. Many of these operations were aimed at wearing down the morale and sapping the energy of the enemy by concentrated and incessant activity in one particular area e.g. : convoys were hit four times around MUIDUMBE - August 25, September 23 and 25, and October 4.
There were at least nine successful offensives around the important and thus heavily protected post of SAGAL, culminating in an attack against the post itself on October 20 when buildings were destroyed and at least 20 Portuguese put out of action.
Mine explosions occurred on August 20, September 10, 20 (twice), 24, 25, October 9, 13 and 21. There was also an ambush on the MUEDA-SAGAL road on October 9.
3. There were 8 ambushes: on September 19 a convoy of 6 lorries

on the CANDULO-MECULA road;
 on September 24, mortars and bazookas followed by light
 infantry ambushed the enemy in the zone of NANGUNDE;
 on September 25 a convoy from MITEDA was hit by the
 peoples' militias;
 on September 26 a convoy of 10 lorries carrying 2
 companies were attacked on the MACOMIA-CHAI road;
 on October 1 a patrol was ambushed between MOCIMBOA
 DA PRAIA and NAMBUDE;
 on October 9, many enemy were killed in the bush in the
 zone of NGOLE and four lorries fell into an ambush on
 the MUEDA - SAGAL road;
 on October 19 a convoy was hit between LITANDA and NTONDO.
 A total of 56 Portuguese were killed

5. So great was the intensity of operations that at certain times they were carried out almost daily:


Sept 19	-	ambush CANDULO - MECULA road
" 20	-	mine explosions twice on MUEDA- SAGAL road
" 23	-	mine explosions MUIDUMBE-NANGOLOLO road
" 24	-	mine explosions MUEDA-SAGAL road
" 24	-	ambush in zone NANGUNDE
" 25	-	mine explosions near SAGAL
" 25	-	mine explosions MUIDUMBE-NANGOLOLO road
" 25	-	ambush zone MEMBA
" 26	-	ambush MACOMIA-CHAI road
Oct 1	-	mine explosion near DIACA
" 1	-	ambush between MOCIMBOA DA PRAIA and NAMBUDE
" 4	-	mine explosion MUIDUMBE - KAVANGA road
" 4	-	MARRUPA - CHIDEMBA road, mine explosion
" 7	-	PUNDANHAR - PALMA road, mine explosion
" 8	-	PUNDANHAR - NYIKA road, mine explosion
" 9	-	MUEDA - SAGAL, mine explosion
" 9	-	ambush zone NGOLE
" 11	-	mine explosion zone MIKALALE
" 13	-	mine explosion SAGAL - MUEDA
" 15	-	mine explosion MOCIMBOA DO ROVUMA - NEGOMANO
" 19	-	ambush between LITANDA and NTONDO
" 20	-	attack on post SAGAL
" 21	-	Mine explosion zone MIKALALE.

6. Our fighters also shot down an aircraft on 15 September. The four crew were killed and our comrades were able to take away 4 heavy machine guns, 1 light machine gun and 1 automatic pistol. When the



Nanyoka,
Cabo Delgado

Portuguese aircraft
shot down
by FRELIMO guerrillas



15 September, 1969

Portuguese arrived a few days later to examine the wreckage, they fell a on our mines that had been placed there and several of them were killed. (See photo of the wreckage on page 9).

AUGUST IN WESTERN NIASA

Our comrades in western Niassa are doing as well as those in Cabo Delgado. In August they undertook 14 successful operations. On the 3, 4, 16 and 17 the enemy fell on our mines in the zone of ICHINGA - MEPOCHE. On 11 August a sabotage unit destroyed the bridge LUZIMBEZI and on 24 August they destroyed 5 more bridges. On 9 August they twice ambushed an enemy group in the zone of UNANGO and on 21 August ambushed again on the DIAS - UNANGO road. On 23 August they attacked the post of NOVA OLIVENCA destroying almost all the houses, 3 vehicles, killing 6 enemy soldiers and freeing many patriots who had been imprisoned.

CERTAINTY

Unburied voices of Kinavane
Unburied voices of Mueda
Rouse us from our slumbers.

And Dantesque visions of Picasso's Guernica
Once more revive the anguish in us
Once more nourish the revolt in us.

The cannons with throats of fire
Spew out symbols of freedom
The deadly bullets write FREEDOM in letters of blood.
Freedom will come from the barrels of red-hot rifles.

When the cashew trees of freedom flower again
When the Kituvanas of peace
Draw geometric patterns on the blue sky - silent
Symbols of peace
Then from the ashes of the past a new Mozambique
Shall arise
Free.

Craveirinha mpfumo

ELECTIONS

Caetano-style

This organ of FRELIMO has already discussed the pretended 'Liberalism' of Marcelo Caetano, a man who is no less Fascist than Salazar. He himself has a direct interest in certain Portuguese capitalist companies, with colonial investments, and he is committed to maintaining the alliance between the neo-fascist landlords and the capitalists, at the expense of Portuguese workers and peasants. Above all, Caetano is determined (with the help of international imperialism) to escalate Portugal's dirty war against African patriots, with the hope of permanently keeping us at the level of slaves. Such hopes will inevitably founder upon the rock of African political consciousness and revolutionary capacity; but Caetano's antics bear watching because they provide evidence of the intentions of the imperialist warmongers who control the industrial / military machine of Western Europe and North America.

It is well known that NATO is responsible for propping up Portugal in Africa, and many events in the current Lisbon political scene are connected with broader manoeuvres for the maintenance of imperialist domination in Africa. This is the case with the recent 'elections' held in Portugal. Under Salazar, the Fascist National Union Party held several 'elections' in which they selected their representatives without bothering to pretend that any opposition candidate was given a fair chance. Caetano's object on this occasion was to present the elections as "free and open", so as to mystify certain sectors of the Portuguese population and to provide his imperialist allies with the cover under which NATO aid to Portugal's war effort can be extended.

The chances are that the NATO powers and the USA in particular must have exerted pressure on Caetano and the National Union Party to provide a democratic facade now that Salazar has gone. This is a characteristic feature of the modus operandi of US imperialism in Latin America. Very often the US State Department has supported the most brutal, reactionary and corrupt dictators in Latin America (just as it supported Salazar), but wherever possible it tries to encourage a 'liberal' alternative; and this has been applied consistently during and since the Kennedy administration. However, the effort in Portugal has not been very successful in misleading Portuguese workers and peasants; and it is essential that all progressive forces should avoid being in the least bit confused.

Election month in Portugal lasted for 28 days, from the 26th September to the 24th October last. There were no rival parties to the National Union Party, and the opposition was merely permitted to form "electoral commissions" which campaigned during those 28 days, and were dissolved immediately after the elections. The whole thing was nothing but a political strip-tease show, during which Portuguese Fascism stripped its none too attractive self. The disrobing revealed enough to embarrass even the capitalist press, which is not renowned for its morality or sense of shame. Far from helping to give Caetano's regime the new look, which the Western press had been playing up, the events of election month brought out clearly that the Fascist state cannot be reformed - it must be destroyed by revolution in Mozambique, Angola and Guinea and within Portugal itself.

Some of the sordid features of election month in Portugal are listed below:

1. The Portuguese Ministry of the Interior banned all street meetings and demonstrations. Forty-eight hours' notice of public meetings had to be given to the authorities. No meeting could continue after midnight and could be stopped if considered "subversive". All posters had to be stamped by the authorities. Loudspeakers could not be used out of doors. Radio and television could not be used by the opposition.
2. The headquarters of the Democratic Electoral Commission in Lisbon was broken into on three occasions by forces who were recognised as members of the political police and the para-military Legion, which has always functioned in Portugal like Hitler's "brown shirts" in Nazi Germany. The offices were ransacked and the opposition candidates assaulted. In addition, the Fascist strong-arm boys went to the printers where the group's manifesto was being printed and thousands of copies were seized.
3. The Electoral Commission for Democratic Unity, the second opposition group, also lost their manifesto at the printers (36,000 copies). This was very significant because, having been restricted in the press and on radio/TV, the rivals to the National Union Party had to rely on their own propaganda efforts. This Commission for Democratic Unity had several of its militants detained by the police, and leaders received frequent death threats.
4. Urbano Tavares Rodrigues, a prominent Portuguese novelist and newspaper columnist, who was standing as an opposition candi-

date in Beja district was badly beaten up by Fascist thugs on the night of October, 15.

5. The Portuguese government expelled a delegation of the Socialist International which visited Lisbon to view the voting. The expulsion came on the final day of the elections; after the Socialist International delegation issued a statement saying: "The Socialist International Commission... feels the election presently allowed by the (Portuguese) regime cannot be judged as democratic or free by any accepted standards of western democracy".
6. On 5th October, 3000 Portuguese citizens including many opposition militants went on a pilgrimage to a Lisbon cemetery to celebrate Republic Day. The ceremony was quiet and orderly, but because of its anti-government implications, the crowd was assailed by Fascist police and dogs. Policemen were seen striking people with rifles and one woman passerby was hit on the back with a club because she did not move out of the way fast enough. Police seized film of the demonstration from foreign newspapermen, while Portuguese photographers were warned not to take any pictures of the police action.
7. It appears that only 19.5% of the Portuguese population was eligible to vote. We need hardly add that after the intimidation came the fraud, thus permitting the National Union Party to win all of the 130 seats.

Caetano tried to deny responsibility for some of the above incidents. His spokesmen privately suggested that violence against the opposition was "part of a campaign of right-wing extremists and fascist groups to discredit Caetano and his attempts to liberalise the regime". Why should a confirmed Fascist like Caetano complain about other people being right-wing extremists and Fascists? The answer lies precisely in the efforts by Caetano and his NATO instructors to put a deceptive new coat of paint over Portuguese Fascism; while some other leading Portuguese Fascists do not see the need to compromise or camouflage in any way. This was the sole point of difference among candidates of the National Union Party in the last 'elections'. It is a disagreement over tactics and it expresses itself in the struggle for personal power within the Fascist hierarchy.

What is certain is that whoever wins the struggle among the various Fascist dogs, the position in Portugal and in the Portuguese colonies

remains the same. Caetano is likely to remain in power because he is following a line approved by countries like Britain, West Germany and the USA, who will continue to give him support so long as he serves their imperialist interests. The oppressed workers and peasants have nothing to do with the goings-on within the Lisbon power structure. Unfortunately, many of them have been so intimidated after nearly four decades of Fascism that they can think of nothing else but to escape from Portugal and find jobs in other parts of Western Europe or in North America. But the will to struggle can never be completely crushed.

During "election month" popular opposition to Fascism in Portugal was illustrated by the symbolic celebration of Republic Day, which had been ignored under Salazar's long rule. Even more important was the courageous strike of Lisbon railway workers on October 20th in the face of Fascist legislation against trade unions and strikes. Indeed, there had been a series of strikes in recent months among dockers, postmen and tram drivers; and these were aimed against one of the bases of the Fascist state: namely, the so-called collective labour contract by which Portuguese labour is guaranteed at the cheapest prices in Europe.

When Caetano's police brutally broke up the Republic Day ceremony one onlooker remarked that "its just like the old days under Salazar"; and so Caetano's pretended liberalism is fooling no one. The opposition candidates themselves had no illusions that they would be better treated under Caetano than they were during Salazar's dictatorship. One opposition leader, Mario Soares, gave a comprehensive analysis of the situation to foreign journalists, explaining that his group knew that the elections were a mere window-dressing, but that they were campaigning "to educate the public in the reality of the system" that they were opposing.

Meanwhile, in Africa Portugal was also holding 'elections'! In Mozambique no opposition candidates were allowed. The number of qualified and registered voters was 82,505. The number of people who actually voted in the nine electoral districts was 79,373. The Portuguese themselves estimate the population of Mozambique at over 8 million, so that the percentage of registered voters is approximately 1% of the population of Mozambique. Yet, the Portuguese have broadcast the claim that in Mozambique they had an electoral turnout of 96.1%! This represents the proportion of actual votes cast in relation to registered voters, so that in relation to the population as a whole the votes cast were less than 1% (0.992%).

Classes and individuals who are destined to be swept onto the rubbish heap of history by the forces of change often lose all sense of reality -

free elections in portugal



as in the classic case of Nero fiddling while Rome burned. That same aura of incredible stupidity today encompasses the Fascist rulers of Portugal. They are capable of describing their colonial war budget as 'aid' to Africa, and they refer to a vote of less than 1% as "the voice of the people of Mozambique". FRELIMO will be doing a service, not only to its own peoples and to Africa, but also to Portugal and the world when it helps to wipe out a system which is so monumentally illogical, immoral and absurd.

Election Results in Mozambique

26 October, 1969.

<u>"District"</u>	<u>Registered</u>	<u>Voters</u> (Those who actually voted)
Cabo Delgado	5513	5500
Gaza	5063	4963
Inhambane	5330	5286
Lourenco Marques	27852	26153
Manica e Sofala	15156	14489
Mozambique	11604	11285
Niassa	1577	1537
Tete	2645	2534
Zambezia	<u>7765</u>	<u>7626</u>
	82505	79373

Percentage of Voters:

79.373 over a population of 8,000,000 =
less than 1% - (exactly : 0,992%)

Portugal

Taut rigging

Dr Salazar never took any chances with elections. His National Union, Portugal's only legal party, regularly filled the national assembly after elections that were so thoroughly rigged that, although repeated attempts were made to launch opposition campaigns, these were usually abandoned before polling day.

Dr Caetano, who has now been prime minister for a full year, is taking little more chance with the elections that are due on October 26th. Skilful news management has produced such headlines in the foreign press as: "Portugal liberalises election law." In substance, all that has changed is that opposition candidates (who are still forbidden to form parties) are to be allowed to see the electoral lists and to attend the counting of votes.

The opposition is denied access to television and radio. Its press conferences are liable to be summarily suppressed by the police, and the press itself is of course censored, as is all election material. Opposition meetings (which must not be held outdoors, or in public buildings) are all attended by the police, who will interrupt them if they think they hear anything subversive. The government can disqualify opposition candidates, and has done so in a number of cases on unconvincing pretexts.

Of the 9.5 million inhabitants of Portugal, only 1.8 million are registered as electors, and a high proportion of these are government employees, who are automatically entitled to a vote and can probably be trusted to cast it the right way. Of the 14 million inhabitants of the "overseas provinces," who are now theoretically all Portuguese citizens with equal rights, only 1 per cent have the vote (and opposition candidatures in the African territories have been rejected wholesale). All things considered, another shoo-in for the government party has

been so firmly ensured that it hardly seemed necessary for General Deslandes, the redoubtable army chief, to issue his stern warning two weeks ago against any ideas people might entertain about upsetting the regime.

The disheartened opposition groups may once again feel obliged to withdraw from a hopeless contest before polling day. Little remains of the hopes that grew among them after Dr Caetano had succeeded Dr Salazar and released the social democratic leader, Mr Mario Soares, from detention on the penal island of Sao Tomé. In May they were emboldened to hold a republican congress at Aveiro, which produced a 14-point basic programme for the restoration of liberty. Since then a sort of rivalry in despair has developed between Mr Soares's group and the left-wing Catholic CDE (Democratic Electoral Committee), which have each presented lists of candidates in Lisbon and Oporto.

Both groups have urged that Portugal should withdraw from its African wars and negotiate settlements based on self-determination. Dr Caetano, however, has made it clear that he will interpret his electoral victory as a rejection of any idea of abandoning the African territories and as confirming the existing policy. The Portuguese people must show, by their votes, that they approve of the struggle to hold Angola, Guinea and Mozambique. So he has told them on radio and television; but his appeals might carry more conviction if he himself were fulfilling his repeated promises of free and fair elections. Meanwhile a recent visitor has discovered that Dr Salazar, from whose sickbed all newspapers are kept away, believes himself to be still running the government of Portugal. Who's to say he is wrong?

EXIT ASEA

ENTER

ENGLISH ELECTRIC?

Cahora Bassa is one of the most important projects yet to be undertaken by an alliance of international capitalistic and imperialistic forces. The aim is to build a £150 million dam and electric power station on the Zambezi to provide the cheapest source of power in the world for the racist regime in South Africa. It will also enable the irrigation of thousands of acres of land on which the Portuguese intend to settle one million immigrants in order to thwart the advance of the nationalist forces. It will therefore result in even further entrenchment of white power in Southern Africa.

The ill-fated Cahora Bassa project has been beset with difficulties since its inception. First of all there was the mutual distrust between the two major partners. South Africa blew hot and cold as she did have suitable sites nearer home, less vulnerable to sabotage, and the Portuguese were not too happy about the increased dependence on its already domineering neighbour that the project will necessarily produce. Moreover, the Portuguese have always gone to great lengths to distinguish their own "multiracial" policy from South African apartheid and a shift from South African to British or American capital might possibly avoid a too close involvement with the regime and thus make the project more acceptable internationally. Thus the preparatory work scheduled to start on November 1, 1968 never took place. In April, 1969, Caetano announced that the ZAMCO Consortium might not get the contract after all, but eventually this was signed in September. Apparently one of the factors in ZAMCO's favour, that outweighed the disadvantage of South African predominance was the participation of the Swedish firm ASEA, with its unique experience in building the long distance, high voltage, direct current transmission lines.

So the project received quite a blow when ASEA suddenly announced its withdrawal from the consortium. There can be no doubt that this decision was forced by the mass opposition to the whole project demonstrated in Sweden, and by the great efforts of our friends in Sweden who publicised the full implications of Swedish involvement in such a colonialist and imperialist plan, and also more important for forcing their government and the firm to react, the outright contravention of any sanctions

policy against Rhodesia that participation would entail. And this was the final reason for ASEA's withdrawal. When announcing the decision the firm itself stated that although deliveries with which ASEA would have been connected would not have infringed the law on sanctions, the fact that other contractors might buy supplies from Rhodesia meant that the firm would be involved in a sanctions-busting project.

After this great victory for progressive forces in Sweden, the Mozambican people now hope for similar support from their friends in England, for it looks as though a British company is about to step into ASEA's shoes.

For reasons already mentioned, Portugal would welcome British participation in the project. Of the several possible contenders to replace ASEA, the British firm, English Electric, which has an "information-swap" agreement with ASEA, and could therefore use the special system it has developed, is expected to do so. There is every reason to believe that Britain would be only too happy to receive this £15 million export order - sanctions or no sanctions. Its unique position as Portugal's "oldest ally" and supporter has already been well documented. Moreover, Britain has already shown more than a passing interest in Cahora Bassa. English Electric, in conjunction with AEI was one of ZAMCO's two main rivals for the contract. Both the British Foreign Office and the Board of Trade gave encouragement to the negotiations, and when the consortium was being formed, talks were held between English Electric and the Exports Credit Guarantee Department. A recent press report has stated that although these talks ceased when EE did not get the contract, they have now been resumed (Sunday Times Business News, 9 November, 1969). Moreover, early in October, 1969, Lord Nelson, the chairman of EE said in an interview with the Stockholm newspaper, 'Svenska Dagbladet' that his company would welcome an opportunity to bid for the contract at the eleventh hour. He said that EE had contacts with ZAMCO. Later a spokesman for the company in London confirmed the company's "great interest" in the ZAMCO contract. (reported in Financial Times of 4 October, 1969).

As far as sanctions are concerned, the British government is, as usual when its direct interests are concerned, burying its head in the sand. In the House of Commons on 21 October, 1969, an M.P. asked the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs what information he had regarding the installation of a £150 million dam in Mozambique and its effect on economic development in Rhodesia. The Parliamentary Under-Secretary, Mr. Evan Luard replied: "If you are referring to the project for a hydro-electric scheme at Cahora Bassa in North-West Mozambique, it is too early to say what effect, if any, this project may have on Rhodesia's economic development." Coming only one month

after a firm accustomed to risking a great deal for its profit margin, had backed out of a £15 million deal because it realised it would undoubtedly be liable to prosecution under the laws of sanctions against Rhodesia, this hypocrisy leaves no misconceptions as to the sincerity of Britain "sanctions" policy. Presumably, when the dam is built, the transmitters are in place, and the current is running along the cable to Salisbury, then Her Majesty's government will decide it is time to apply sanctions - for then the £15 million will be safely in its pocket. Perhaps Britain should be reminded of a few facts:-

- the United Nations Security Council resolution of May, 1968, for which Britain voted, forbids U.N. members from activities on the part of their nationals "which could promote or are calculated to promote the export of any commodities or products from Southern Rhodesia".

- Britain's own Order in Council, in addition to forbidding the export of any goods to Rhodesia, adds that no British subject may either "deal in" any such goods nor "do any act calculated to promote" the "acquisition, disposal or processing by himself or any other person" of goods exported from Rhodesia.

It hardly seems credible that Britain can seriously doubt that Cahora Bassa will do anything other than give a great boost to the Rhodesian economy - both in the eventual provision of the cheapest source of power it has ever known and, more immediately, through the demand it will generate for materials, equipment and probably labour. If the British government needs proof:

- 1) The huge output from the dam will be more than is required by the three main receiving countries, South Africa, Mozambique and Malawi. Rhodesia needs more power, particularly such cheap power. Portugal will not sit back with excess capacity while an eager customer is sitting on her doorstep.
- 2) A 'Newsreel' item broadcast on Salisbury radio on 15 July, 1968 said: "Rhodesia has a triple interest in this venture. The country must welcome the project, for its successful completion can only enhance the prospects for continued political stability and economic expansion in Southern Africa. More immediately, Rhodesian firms should be well placed in the supply of goods and materials for the dam site for at least a foreseeable period of up to five years. Lastly, Rhodesia has a very real interest in the power that will be generated at Cahora Bassa, as with her economy expanding at its present rate and spurred on by sanctions Rhodesia's requirements for industrial use alone will outstrip present supplies

by the early 1970s. If the Cahora Bassa power is going to be as economical as the Portuguese say it is going to be, then it seems likely that it is from this source that Rhodesia will draw her power rather than commit a huge sum in implementing the planned stage two of the Kariba scheme to increase the dam's productivity. Taken as a whole the Cahora Bassa dam scheme paints a very bright picture indeed for political and economic interdependence for go-ahead Southern Africa."

- 3). As early as November, 1967, the Portuguese newspaper Primeiro de Janeiro stated that the Rhodesian and Portuguese authorities had met in Lisbon to discuss the Cahora Bassa project. More recently in June this year the Rhodesian Under-Secretaries for Commerce, Industry and Agriculture were in Lisbon for official talks with members of the Portuguese government.
- 4) The Rhodesians have already built a road to the TETE border to facilitate the delivery of supplies and materials.
- 5) Brigadier Andrew Dunlop, Rhodesian Minister of Transport and Power, after holding talks concerning the dam with Portuguese officials in Lisbon, was quoted by the Johannesburg STAR as saying that he thought that Rhodesian manufacturing industries would do very well as suppliers to the builders of the dam, and cited cement and steel as examples (11 May, 1968).
- 6) A Swedish journalist who recently visited Mozambique reported in the Swedish newspaper "Aftonbladet" that he visited Cahora Bassa with two Rhodesian business men who were waiting to send road machines from Salisbury.
- 7) The National Export Council of Rhodesia has issued an eight-page pamphlet "The Way to Cahora Bassa" with hints for Rhodesian businessmen.

Finally, the whole purpose of sanctions is to weaken the Smith regime and bring it down. The most important project for achieving precisely the opposite of this is the Cahora Bassa project, for it will ensure even closer ties between Southern racist countries and give an even greater boost to the concept of a Southern African common market, this in turn strengthening the already existing political and military alliances. For example, apart from the power link itself, closer cooperation will be facilitated by the opening of the Zambezi and the development of water transport, by reciprocal banking and labour agreements, by the distribution of branches of firms- all of which

will undoubtedly be accompanied by arrangements for the mutual defence of such interests. Thus, Cahora Bassa would become, as stated some time ago by a writer in "Le Monde" "the axis along which European settlement in South Africa may be regrouped and consolidated. We may thus witness the crystallisation of an economic network both very powerful and potentially very profitable, capable of giving the rulers of Southern Africa the practical and financial means of riveting their dominant influence and perhaps their racist policies upon a whole range of African peoples far to the North of South Africa."

FRELIMO will do all in its power to stop this project. But our resources are limited. This is an issue of the utmost importance to our struggle because, if successful, its one million white settlers will make Portuguese power more entrenched, and thus that much more difficult to destroy. The Portuguese government is well aware of this, and will use all the means at its disposal, plus those of its imperialist and racist allies to ensure that the project goes ahead. The combined efforts of FRELIMO in Mozambique and the progressive forces of the world outside, will be able to stop them.

English Electric must not participate in Cahora Bassa.



Dams

The politics of power

The shouts of Swedish student demonstrators have produced a loud echo in the Zambesi Valley this month. Political and legal pressures in Stockholm which made the electro-manufacturing giant ASEA walk out of a 14-company consortium may have dealt a serious blow to the £150 million dam on the Zambesi at Cabora Bassa in the Portuguese territory of Mozambique. Any prospect that ASEA could be wowed back seem to have faded away.

The consortium, Zamco, was painstakingly constructed by South Africa's Anglo American Corporation in 1967 to bid for the dam contract, and seemed to have all the talents needed. ASEA, with its unique mastery of high-voltage direct current systems, ensured that Cabora Bassa's power could be moved to the main potential buyer, South Africa, more cheaply and without the heavy losses of current involved in a/c transmission over long distances.

Zamco was awarded the tentative contract more than a year ago in the face of largely British and American rivalry; its own ranks included, in addition to ASEA, French, Italian and German concerns. Then in Lisbon the Portuguese began to brood. At one point, Dr Caetano implied that he was revoking the deal with Zamco. Months slipped by, with Zamco's chairman, Mr Ted Brown, commuting between Johannesburg and Europe in efforts to win a formal signature in time for engineering work to start before the November-April rains put the Zambesi in spate. That is where the left-wing Swedish students came in. The delay allowed the mounting of a campaign against ASEA's involvement in a scheme that would prop up Portuguese colonialism in Africa, supply cheap power to South Africa and possibly benefit nearby rebel Rhodesia. Swedish opinion on this last point could run high; a law was passed in Sweden making it an offence to be involved in any concern trading with Rhodesia. At first, after the protests ASEA sat tight, reluctant to lose a job in which its share would be around £16 million. It also told the politicians that it might have to fire 500 men if the work did not come through.

But when at last Mr Brown of Zamco rose triumphant from the negotiations on September 3rd with a firm contract, that very afternoon the Swedish company said it was no longer part of Zamco. A message from the board said ASEA had not renewed its tender when this had expired on July 31st—although it is unclear whether Zamco or the Portuguese were aware of that.

Zamco is putting a brave face on it all. The French and west German participants, Alsthom and Siemens, say they will fill the breach. But for the vital mercury valves for the HVDC system, Zamco may have to turn to the English Electric part of British GEC, with which ASEA has links. As it happens, English Electric was in the British consortium beaten to the Lisbon post. Amid all the anxiety, the South African power authority, Escom, may grow bearish and look to alternative sources not so far from home (the Cabora Bassa transmission lines would be more than 850 vulnerable miles long through Mozambique). Industrial growth in South Africa makes new power essential by the mid-1970s—and Cabora Bassa would provide more than 2,000 MW after meeting the needs of Mozambique. But apart from the deadline for work on the site next month, Zamco must also face the risk that other members of the consortium could trip over the sanctions hurdles.

Farther up the Zambesi, another dam scheme looks healthier. Very shortly, signatures should complete several months of negotiating for the £25 million North Bank station at Kariba, which will give an extra source of power for Zambia's copper mines, augment the supplies from the Kafue project now being constructed near Lusaka, and avoid the need for the costly Kafue Stage Two. Zambia will have complete control over the new Kariba station and need no longer rely upon the goodwill of Mr Ian Smith on the south bank. As it happens, Britain will be using Rhodesian funds frozen in Britain since UDI for its part in financing the project.





The role of women in the Revolution

by Josina Machel, a political commissar
in the Women's Detachment

It was in October, 1966, in a meeting of the Central Committee, that FRELIMO decided that the Mozambican woman should take a more active part in the struggle for national liberation, at all levels. It was decided that she should receive political and military training in order to make her more capable of fulfilling whatever tasks the revolution might demand of her. Thus, a few months later, in the beginning of 1967, the first group of women from Cabo Delgado and Niassa began their training. At first this was merely an experiment to discover just what contribution women could make to the revolution - how they would use their initiative, whether they were in fact capable of fulfilling certain tasks. The "experiment" proved highly successful and this first group of women became the founder-members of the women's detachment, and were scattered throughout the interior each with her specific assignment. It was soon discovered that they could play a very important role both in the military and political fields, but especially in the latter.

One of the prime functions of a women's army is, quite naturally, just like the men's army, participation in combat. In Mozambique the women's military activities are usually concentrated in the defence of the liberated areas, thus freeing the men for the offensive actions in the zones of advance. However, many of the women prefer the more active combats in the advance zones and choose to fight alongside the men in ambushes, and mining operations, where they have proved themselves as capable and courageous as any of their male comrades. As another aspect of this function, we have also women working in the Department of Security constantly on the look-out for enemy infiltration.

Although highly effective in the field of combat, their contribution has been less noticeable (just because of their relatively small numbers compared with the men) than their activities in the political field, where their impact has been far out of proportion to their numbers. Since 1967 the women have demonstrated that they have a key role in the mobilisation and political education of both the people and the soldiers themselves. In this work we explain to the people the need to fight,



what kind of struggle we are waging, with whom we fight, and against whom, what are the reasons for our struggle, what are our aims, and why we chose an armed struggle as the only means to independence. We explain the work we are doing and the results we have achieved so far. We explain how we are dependent to a certain extent on foreign aid and which countries and organisations are helping us, and that, despite this help, we must be as self-reliant as possible.

In this connection, it is stressed that the success of the revolution depends on the combined efforts of everyone such that no one can be omitted, and thus the traditional rather "passive" role of women must be changed so that their abilities are used to the full. Women are encouraged to give their opinions in meetings, to participate in the various committees, etc. Here we have the rather difficult task of fighting old prejudices that women's functions should be confined to cooking, rearing children, etc. It has been proved that we women can perform this task of mobilisation and education better than the men for two reasons. Firstly, it is easier for us to approach other women, and secondly, the men are more easily convinced of the important role of women when confronted with the unusual sight of confident and capable female militants who are themselves the best examples of what they are propounding. However, our activities are directed equally at the men and the presence of emancipated women bearing arms often shames them into taking more positive action.

In order to achieve self-sufficiency in the liberated areas, we explain to the people that agricultural production must be increased, not only for themselves but also to help feed the army, as the first duty of the guerrillas is fighting and thus they cannot always cultivate enough to supply their bases. We also need extra supplies to assist our comrades in the zones of advance where the constant military activity and the presence of enemy troops make regular agricultural production difficult. There is no question of persuading the people to participate in the war effort but they have to be explained the political basis and implications of the revolution, and while well aware that they themselves have certain important responsibilities in the struggle, they need guidance as to which particular fields they should work in. Once the people are fully aware of the situation they act without hesitation. In addition to increasing agricultural output, they help transport the sick and wounded, help care for the sick, help transport war material and organise themselves into militants.

In addition to its political work, the women's detachment also has extensive duties in the field of social welfare. We assist and give comfort to families who have lost relatives in the war. This is

extremely delicate work requiring a great deal of patience. We also run the FRECIMO orphanage, which not only cares for orphans, but also children separated from their parents due to the war. Some of our women are trained in first aid so that they can help the medical assistants in the health centres. Many of our women are also working in the Department of Education in their literacy campaigns and in the primary schools. Here again we have to overcome the outdated prejudices of fathers and husbands regarding the idea of education for women. But we are gradually winning the battle for they realise that a literate and educated woman can make a far more constructive contribution to the revolution than an ignorant one. We now have many girls in our schools, some of whom have female teachers, and some of these girls are already participating in literacy campaigns for the older people.

Thus, apart from its strictly military functions the women's detachment has important political duties on two levels. At one level it is charged with the mobilisation and education of the people, to increase the effectiveness of their participation by developing their political understanding of the war. This we do for everyone, irrespective of sex, although we have a unique opportunity to reach our own sex that is denied to our male comrades. Once this has been achieved, we work at the next level of encouraging even more active participation by inviting people to follow our example, to leave their homes and train as fighters, nurses, teachers, etc. In this way the size of the women's detachment has increased considerably since that first experimental group and the point has now been reached where some of those first recruits have gained enough experience and knowledge so that they can become political and military trainers for their own detachment, and also assist their male colleagues in the bases to instruct elements of the population.

At the last meeting of the Central Committee in April, 1969, it was decided that the Mozambican Women's League (LIFEMO) should be completely fused with the women's detachment and we are still in the process of integrating into the army all the activities formerly carried on by LIFEMO. During its existence LIFEMO did some useful work but with the development of the struggle, the demands of the war inevitably required that all its efforts be concentrated inside Mozambique and hence be conducted by the women's detachment in the interior.

PORTUGUESE SOLDIERS

IN FREE MOZAMBIQUE

Six Portuguese deserters and two prisoners recently arrived in Algeria, after spending from six to eighteen months with FRELIMO forces in Mozambique. They were:

Joao Borges Gomes	Captured March, 1968
Fernando dos Santos Rosa	" March, 1968.
Manuel des Jesus Santos	deserted October, 1968
Americo Neves de Sousa	" October, 1968
Manuel da Silva Lopes	" October, 1968
Eusebio Martinho da Silva	" March, 1969
Jose Antonio Ferreira da Mata	" March, 1969
Jose Augusto Lopes	" March, 1969.

Shortly before taking their leave of FRELIMO, they talked about their experiences in the liberated areas of Mozambique.

Although they were occasionally moved from one base or camp to another, they always took part in the everyday activities. This consisted mainly of agricultural work in the fields, but three of them, Americo de Sousa, Jesus Santos and Santos Rosa spent a lot of their time teaching in the local schools. Life was certainly not comfortable, for conditions in the bush in a time of war are far from easy, but they all appreciated that their difficulties were due to the war situation and not to any harsh treatment at the hands of FRELIMO.

One of the most difficult problems they faced was that of the climate. They found certain areas very cold even though they were well supplied with clothes and a blanket each, when many of the FRELIMO soldiers were very poorly dressed and some almost naked. They all missed their cigarettes and also good food. Although they never went without food, it was sometimes scarce and not very good. The variety of food was also very limited, consisting of maize, rice or cassava with occasionally some chicken. Moreover, sometimes when enemy planes were in the area they could not light fires and hence could not cook their food.

When asked what signs of war they had seen, they replied that apart from the heavily armed FRELIMO soldiers, and the presence of much war material being transported around, the combat zones were far away and the people's daily lives continued undisturbed. Thus, they saw no fighting although Fernando dos Santos Rosa commented that a few months after being captured he had been in C bo Delgado not far from Mueda and had heard the explosions and gunfire when the airfield was attacked by FRELIMO forces. However, although the Portuguese troops could not operate in the liberated areas, the Portuguese air force could still carry out constant bombing raids. All of them witnessed air attacks. Indeed, they themselves experienced a few such raids that were a little too close for comfort. Americo Neves de Sousa laughed when he recalled one such occasion when three of them were in an air-raid shelter and a bomb exploded close by. They all panicked and ran out of the shelter in such confusion that they kept falling over each other, thus putting themselves in much more danger than before. A FRELIMO soldier had to take them in charge and make them camouflage themselves. Manuel de Jesus Santos described how, on another occasion, a surprise bombing raid caught them unawares while they were washing by a river. They had to dash for cover completely naked.

Having spent such a long time among the Mozambican people, alongside them, these Portuguese had a unique opportunity to get to know our people, observe our life and our struggle; our morale and determination, the peoples' sharp, clear awareness of the situation, of what they are fighting for; the consciousness that it will be a protracted war and what sacrifices are involved. They were able to compare their own experience and observations with the fantasies propagated by the Portuguese army authorities, and their experience of urban Mozambicans corrupted by the Portuguese. Apart from the most obvious things such as the absence of "foreign instigators", the presence of thousands of well-armed troops instead of small groups of "bandits", there were several aspects of revolutionary life that made a particular impression on them.

Americo Neves de Sousa, for example, kept comparing the women in the bases to the women that spent their time hanging around the Portuguese army headquarters, who had no self-respect and were practically bought and sold by the Portuguese. In the liberated areas he found women with dignity, and pride in themselves and their country. He observed how they participated equally with men in every activity; they worked in the fields; they taught in the schools, they sat on committees and spoke well at meetings, they fought in the army (it took the Portuguese some time to get used to the sight of women carrying guns!). Similarly, the very young and the very old were also engaged in specific tasks of the revolution, such that no-one could ever say that it was only the guerrillas who were fighting the war - but everyone. Augusto Lopes was particularly amazed at the maturity of the children, how they participated and

expressed an understanding of the struggle that one would have expected only from a much older person.

Everywhere these Portuguese soldiers went they were struck by our constant preoccupation with education, not just for the children, but for their parents and the army as well. Augusto Lopes said that neither he nor any of his fellow soldiers had been given the opportunity to improve their education in the Portuguese army. And indeed, he found the whole atmosphere in the FRELIMO army was something completely new and unlike anything he had experienced before. He constantly sensed an all-pervading morale of close comradeship and respect for one another that had been totally absent in the Portuguese posts. He felt that this was attributable to the basic difference between the two armies, namely, the one being composed of individuals under compulsion, far from home who were constantly counting the days until their demobilisation, and the other composed of guerrillas fighting by choice and desire, in the knowledge that they could never rest until the foreigner was driven from their homeland. But he felt there was also another reason. There was, of course, very strong discipline in the bases, but there was never the huge gulf and hostility between army leaders and the guerrillas as there was between the Portuguese officers and the ranks, who lived and worked under completely different conditions and never met except to give and receive orders. In FRELIMO, all the fighters lived and fought side by side, suffered the same hardships and shared the joy of their victories. Americo Neves de Sousa remarked that there was complete respect for each other and he felt that even though they were from the enemy, and some were prisoners, they were respected as human beings and treated as such in a way that they had never experienced in the Portuguese army.

Everyone was extremely impressed with the extensive medical facilities available for both the army and the civilians. Joao Borges Gomes had good reason to be particularly grateful for this. For when taken prisoner he was unconscious through loss of blood from a severe bullet wound in the thigh. Indeed, when he was finally brought to a base it was thought at first that he was already dead. However, after intensive medical care over a long period - nine months in fact - he recovered completely. During their long stay in the bush most of them fell ill at one time or another but they always received attention immediately from FRELIMO medical assistants. Once one of them became very ill and as none of the drugs required were available and no one qualified to treat him, the provincial leaders sent for someone from outside. He had daily injections for many months until he was cured. (They apparently found all this attention for someone of a different colour and from the enemy army quite incomprehensible).

They were also impressed by the highly efficient administrative organisation and the many varied kinds of cooperatives. They mentioned particularly the committees that organise the transport of food from one area to another where there is a shortage, and the hunting units that provide food for the military bases and villages. They were very impressed by the fact that all these activities were run by the people themselves.

When asked how much access they had to information from the world outside, they replied that this was very limited, but they did have radios and thus sometimes heard radio broadcasts from Lourenco Marques and also the FRELIMO broadcasts. They also had access to newspapers, although very much out of date, and also the FRELIMO newspaper and the bi-monthly magazine. On a couple of occasions they were able to obtain first-hand information when they met visitors from outside - a women journalists and seven students from the University College, Dar es Salaam, with whom they had interesting talks. They were all aware of the forthcoming elections in Portugal but had very little interest as they had not voted before and could not see any meaning in it. Things never changed when one voted, they said, and in any case very few of them were even eligible.

Of course, they also heard a good deal about events outside from their long discussions with the FRELIMO soldiers, many of whom periodically went on missions outside. One topic in the discussions was the Cahora Bassa project and they remarked how bitter were feelings on this subject and how determined the guerrillas were that it should never materialise. Some of the Portuguese had not heard of the project before until FRELIMO told them, but others had been made well aware of it. Manuel da Silva Lopes said that many of his fellow soldiers had talked about trying to obtain employment on the construction of the dam when they left the army. Martinho da Silva also said that the authorities had announced invitations for soldiers due to finish their assignments, to settle in Tete in the area of the dam. He had been very interested in this and had been sent two applications forms which he had completed and sent in.

They all heard of the death of President Mondlane at different times. Jose da Mata was still with the Portuguese at that time and he described how jubilant was their reaction. He recounted how a Portuguese civilian told him: 'The most difficult has been achieved. Now there just remains the rest'. However, after his desertion he soon discovered how false was this prophecy, how the anticipated demoralisation and collapse is in fact increased hatred and determination to fight. Fernando dos Santos Rosa had already been with us about a year when one day he noticed that the usual bustling atmosphere of the place where he was staying, was suddenly replaced by a very quiet, subdued

air. He realised something was wrong when all the soldiers inverted their guns with the butts upwards in a sign of mourning, but he wasn't told anything and it was some weeks before life returned to normal. He did not learn what had happened until much later. Martinho da Silva recounted that he did not know of the death when he deserted, and was only told when he was with FRELIMO. He said that for a long time there was a general air of sadness but nothing that could be called demoralisation. The fighters had by no means lost their courage, as was well demonstrated by their achievements when they went out on missions.

In their talks with various provincial leaders, they were constantly assured that one day they would be taken outside. They saw no reason to disbelieve this but as the months dragged by they began to have serious doubts. They were apparently particularly depressed after meeting the visiting journalist, as they had been convinced that she had come to make preliminary arrangements for their departure. They began to wonder whether FRELIMO was just playing a game with them, and so the eventual announcement was something of a surprise. The complex arrangements involved had necessarily taken a long time to finalise.

When they spoke to the Département of Information a few weeks ago, they were all highly excited about the prospect of starting a new life, although at the same time also slightly anxious as to what the future would hold for them. Planning for the future was hardly feasible then, but most of them had vague ideas about what they wanted to do, ideas obviously influenced by their experiences in Mozambique. José da Mata, Martinho da Silva and José Lopes wanted to work for the Portuguese opposition, either in Algeria or any other country opposed to the Portuguese regime. Fernando dos Santos Rosa was also willing to work for the Portuguese opposition but his prime desire was to join his family in France. Deeply influenced by FRELIMO's emphasis on education, and stimulated by their participation in various educational programmes, both Americo Neves de Sousa and Manuel de Jesus Santos wanted to go anywhere where they could be able to study. The latter wanted to become a medical assistant. Only one, João Borges Gomes, wanted to return to Portugal to rejoin his family.

The future is very uncertain for all of them, perhaps the only assured fact being that they will not receive a very warm welcome should they ever return to Portugal. Whatever they may do, FRELIMO wishes them well. Our fight is not with the Portuguese people but with the Portuguese colonialist authorities and military machine.

On the external front

It is important for the success of our liberation struggle, that some of our activities should be directed beyond the boundaries of Mozambique, to the world outside. Although the task of freeing our beloved country from foreign domination is the responsibility of we Mozambicans, we must not become too introspective, looking solely inward to our fight. For we know that ours is not a struggle in isolation, but is just a small part of the world struggle against imperialism and exploitation. And we must maintain firm links with our comrades outside who are fighting the same battle.

Moreover, although we know that the duty to fight is ~~ours~~ alone, we cannot combat the most modern NATO weapons with spears and bows and arrows; or disease and ignorance with witchcraft. We need machine guns, bazookas and mines; education equipment, medicines, clothing and transport equipment for our social reconstruction. In short, we need material assistance from our friends outside. However, no such assistance is forthcoming unless the donors are satisfied that it will be used properly. It is here that the Department of External Affairs and the Department of Information have special responsibilities to keep our friends informed of the progress of our struggle, our difficulties, our achievements and our needs.

These close contacts are all the more essential in view of the vast imperialist propaganda machine at the disposal of our enemies. Its power and influence have been particularly marked over the past year when it has commented widely on our problems, the death of Comrade Mondlane, the defection of Kavandame, and gleefully speculated that "FRELIMO is going to pieces". In order to counter this we have had to intensify our international contacts to explain what is the real situation - to explain the real repercussions of the death of President Mondlane, that the struggle will continue unabated, that FRELIMO is united, the real meaning of the defection of Kavandame, the meaning of the decisions of the Central Committee meeting of April, 1969, and the meaning of the establishment of the Council of the Presidency.

It has been found through experience that the most effective way of maintaining these contacts and of providing this information is through personal representation. This has the double advantage of avoiding any possibility of misunderstanding on the part of our friends overseas,

and also of enabling us to judge more accurately just who our friends are. We do this in two ways: through personal representation to government and organisations both by special missions and also the everyday work of our representatives in Dar es Salaam, Lusaka, Cairo, Algiers, Stockholm and the United Nations; and also by participation in international meetings and conferences. The latter are particularly useful as they enable our delegates to meet and talk with representatives of many organisations and countries in one place, instead of visiting each individual country. The following were our overseas missions during the last few months:

June	Yugoslavia, talks with the Socialist Alliance of the Workers. World Council of Peace, Berlin, German Democratic Republic. German Democratic Republic. World Conference of Women, Helsinki, Finland.
July	Poland International Seminar of Youth on Lenin and the Contemporary World, Moscow, USSR. Meeting of the OAU Liberation Committee, Dakar Senegal. Third Meeting of the Council of Direction of CONCP. (Conference of Nationalist Organisations of Portuguese Colonies). Guinea, Conakry and PAIGC. Pan-African Cultural Festival, Algiers.
July-Aug	USSR, Mongolia, United Arab Republic.
August -	Algeria, talks with the Algerian Government.
Aug-Sept.	Council of Ministers Meeting of OAU, Addis Aababa.
Sept. -	Meeting of the Heads of State of OAU, Addis Aababa. North Korea, International Conference on the Tasks of the Journalists of the Whole World in their Struggle Against US Imperialist Aggression.
Oct.	Congress of the Social Democratic Party of Sweden. England Switzerland

Oct.

Symposium on Lenin and the Movement of National Liberation, USSR.

Yugoslavia, International Symposium of Youth and Congress of War Veterans of Yugoslavia.

In addition, in her campaign to raise funds for the Mozambique Institute, in June and July, Comrade Janet Mondlane visited Sweden, Norway, England, Holland and Switzerland.

Thus, our liberation struggle is being fought, not only internally but also on the external front.

AATUF AND FRELIMO REINFORCE THEIR SOLIDARITY
AGAINST PORTUGUESE COLONIALISM AND
INTERNATIONAL IMPERIALISM

In the morning of Saturday, December 6, 1969, Comrade Marcelino Dos Santos, member of the Council of Presidency of FRELIMO, paid a courtesy visit to the Secretariat of the ALL-AFRICAN TRADE UNION FEDERATION and held discussions with Comrade Amadou N'Diaye, Permanent Secretary of the Federation. The discussions were held within the framework of AATUF's interest in FRELIMO which represents the struggling workers of Mozambique as members of AATUF.

Emerging out of the discussions, the All-African Trade Union Federation expressed its continued support for FRELIMO, especially for the heroic efforts being made by the MOVEMENT to defeat Portuguese colonialism in Mozambique.

Comrade Dos Santos informed the AATUF Secretariat about the level of development of the armed struggle and stressed that the success of the Revolution necessitated that FRELIMO must pursue its clear and revolutionary ideology.


On behalf of FRELIMO and AATUF, comrade Dos Santos and comrade N'Diaye respectively appreciated the very important role of TANU, the Government and People of Tanzania in the struggle of FRELIMO, hailing the support of Tanzania as a cardinal contribution to the liberation of the people of Mozambique.

AMADOU N'DIAYE
(AATUF Permanent Secretary)

MARCELINO DOS SANTOS
(Member of the Council of
Presidency of FRELIMO)

Dar Es Salaam, 6th December, 1969

* JOINT STATEMENT BY AATUF AND FRELIMO *



25 SEPTEMBER

The fifth anniversary of the beginning of the armed struggle in Mozambique was this year marked not only by the usual events in the liberated areas of Mozambique - public meetings in all bases and villages, feasts and dances, plays performed by school children - but also by our friends outside - Tanzania, Zambia, England, Holland, etc. The form and content of their meetings varied considerably but they all had the same aim of signifying 25 September as a very special date in the lives of the Mozambican people - the day on which the revolution really started.

Our friends in Holland, for example, organised several meetings in various towns including the university of Leiden, attended by members of many different organisations: The Angola Committee, the Labour Party, the Youth of the Labour Party, the Committee of Mothers that Want Peace, the Party of "Radikalen", the Pacifist Social Party, the Southern Africa Committee, NESBIC, and the Workgroup on Southern Africa. In Zambia there was a public meeting in the African Liberation Centre and an exhibition of photographs. In Tanzania the University College Revolutionary Front organised a march and demonstration on the campus, followed by an open-air meeting. They also arranged an exhibition of photographs illustrating the various aspects of the struggle in Mozambique. From England we have received the following report from the Committee for Freedom in Mozambique:-

In England the 25 September was celebrated at an informal gathering organised by the Committee for Freedom in Mozambique. Film, poetry, drama were used to illustrate the nature of the struggle in Mozambique and a tape recording of Mozambican music was played. These were followed up by a brief report from the Secretary of the Committee on the development of the struggle over the past year. The rest of the evening was left open for a general discussion which was to concentrate on the relationship between the struggle in Mozambique and the struggle of progressive forces in England.

The film Venceremos was shown, and the poetry read was selected from the work of poets from Mozambique, Angola and Guiné. The most controversial item was a short play produced by members of Agitprop and CAST, two groups which have been experimenting with drama as a means of political mobilisation. The performance was of special interest because it was the first time that either group had worked on an external political issue,

and their treatment was largely concerned with the relevance of such an issue to England's own problems. It thus formed an excellent starting point for discussion.

In the argument that followed two extreme points of view were heard: one was that concern with foreign struggles could bring no advantage to either side until a more progressive government could be established in England; the other was that since the present system of government is dependent on the exploitation of the Third World, we should concentrate on supporting the revolutionary forces there. After both points of view had been examined it was agreed that the divergence was mainly due to an inadequate analysis on both sides; that while the main aim of all progressive forces in England must be to fight exploitation in England and to engage in struggle here, yet because England forms part of the international capitalist power structure, it is also important to recognise as our allies and to work with other people and movements fighting this structure. Therefore solidarity with movements such as FRELIMO must form part of the programme of any progressive political movement in England.

In practical terms in relation to Mozambique today, every effort must be made to prevent the British government or private commercial interests from helping Portugal in any way; material support for FRELIMO must be organised; the general level of political education in this country must be raised so that the 'local' and 'international' outlooks can no longer be considered mutually exclusive."

In addition, messages of solidarity were received from many organisations, including:

Polish Solidarity Committee, Warsaw
International Union of Students, Prague.
World Council of Peace, Helsinki
Committee for Freedom in Mozambique, London
Organisation of African Unity, Dar es Salaam
Union of Students from Black Africa under Portuguese Colonial
Domination (UGEAN), Prague.
Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee, Berlin, German Democratic Republic.
Zimbabwe African Peoples Union, Dar es Salaam
Consul-General, German Democratic Republic, Dar es Salaam
National Union of Mozambican Students (UNEMO)
Socialist Alliance of the Working People of Yugoslavia
Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee, USSR.
Albanian Trade Unions, Tirana
Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola, Brazzaville
Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee, People's Republic of Korea

Permanent Representative of the Provisional Revolutionary
Government of the Republic of South Vietnam, Dar es Salaam
Afro-Asian Solidarity Association, Ceylon
African National Congress of South Africa, Dar es Salaam
Frente Patriotica de Libertacao Nacional (Portuguese Opposition)
Algiers.

Solidarity Organisation of the Peoples of Africa and Asia (OSPAA)
African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde Islands
Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee, Bulgaria
International Association of Democratic Jurists.

In addition, the following message was received from the Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee of South Vietnam:

"On the day of international solidarity with the people of Mozambique we send to our brothers in Mozambique warm greetings stop the people of South Vietnam follow with deep sympathy and resolutely support the just struggle of the patriotic people of Mozambique against the Portuguese colonialist regime for national independence stop We are certain that with strong militant solidarity the people of Mozambique under the leadership of FRELIMO will win victory stop Salutations of militant solidarity for victory stop Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee of South Vietnam.



KAVANDAME MEETS THE PRESS

A Swiss journalist, Mr. Marc Heyd, recently visited the Portuguese colonies and wrote several articles on his impressions for the newspaper, "La Suisse". In Porto Amelia, Mozambique, he was allowed to interview the FRELIMO traitor, Lazaro Kavandame, and the following are his comments:

"Solidly 'accompanied' by Portuguese officials, Lazaro Kavandame, sixty years old, greying hair, spectacles, very elegant in a brown outfit, put himself at the disposal of the interview that will last several hours in suffocating heat.

The linguistic difficulties are almost insurmountable: Kavandame speaks only a Swahili-Makonde dialect, and a little Portuguese. An interpreter translates what he says very approximately into Portuguese and another gives it back in English... then I have to end up with a French version.

But one can sense that the former rebel chief does not want - or cannot say anything except generalities. I at least learn that he gave himself up to the Portuguese 'because FRELIMO betrayed his people, that they were suffering too much from the war, that there were too many deaths and that he wanted to collaborate with the Portuguese in order to live in peace.'

He says that many people followed him, but does not want to give any numbers, nor to give an indication of the importance of the defections in the military and psychological field. He adds that 'a number of Makondes fled from Mozambique at the beginning of the hostilities and now a reverse movement is being produced. The atrocities, particularly the kidnappings - it is the people from FRELIMO who commit these things, and not the Portuguese.' Thus he has set about combatting the influence of this liberation movement among his people.

All this seems a little like a lesson that has been learned off by heart, and a lack of liberty of expression. Without doubt, Kavandame has a very narrow margin of movement; his enemies of yesterday want to keep him alive to utilise him for their propaganda aims and his enemies of today probably wish for his disappearance. In any case, he is not a free man in his movements and his words.

The Portuguese will do all they can to obtain the most profit they can from his desertion. They are distributing pamphlets - in both Makonde dialect and Portuguese - with a photograph of Kavandame and his signature encouraging the 'rebels' to follow his example, they make him speak on the radio in the same way, etc.

But this is war, and all methods are good."

APARTHEID AND RACISM IN MOZAMBIQUE - Alliance between S. Africa, Portugal and Rhodesia

Portugal is no new offender against the sentiments of human justice; and its crimes against the African people of Mozambique and elsewhere have time and again been brought before the U.N. Fully substantiated indictments have been laid at Portugal's door with respect to forced labour and the export of labour from Mozambique on a neo-slave basis. The world is also aware of Portugal's obstinate denial of national independence for the people of Mozambique, Angola and Guinea (Bissau).

One of the more recent occasions when Portugal's crimes against the people of Mozambique were under the scrutiny of the U.N. was in July 1967, when the U.N. (in collaboration with the government of Zambia) sponsored an international seminar on "The problems of apartheid, racial discrimination and colonialism in Southern Africa". The working paper prepared for the Secretary General on the territories under Portuguese domination noted that UNESCO (like several other specialised U.N. agencies) had been applying a policy of exclusion towards Portugal, for the following reason:

"The government of Portugal still pursues in the African territory under its domination a policy of colonialism and racial discrimination, depriving the peoples of those territories of the most basic rights to education and culture, and thus violating the fundamental obligations of all member countries of UNESCO."

That statement which is couched in most moderate terms, represents the consensus of world opinion.

In November, 1967, FRELIMO appeared before the U.N. Special Committee on Decolonisation and prefaced their remarks by referring to the record of FRELIMO's representations before various bodies of the U.N. FRELIMO's purpose on this occasion is to bring the record up to date on the question of Portuguese colonialism and racial domination as it has been manifest over the past two years.

The national liberation effort in Mozambique entered its armed phase nearly five years ago. Today, the military struggle is carried on under the direction of FRELIMO in over one-third of the territory of Mozambique. Both the armed national fight and the liberated zones are constantly being extended. In the liberated zones, FRELIMO is functioning as a government responsible for (a) the lives and security of the inhabitants, (b) the organisation of agriculture and trade, (c) the provision of amenities such as schools and hospitals, and, (d) the building of a new concept of a new man and a non-racist culture.

Furthermore, the democratic structure and unity of FRELIMO has ensured that residents from all over Mozambique are involved in the present re-structuring of the national life, which has begun in the liberated zones. At our last conference, which was held on Mozambican soil in the province of Niassa, delegates came from every province of the country, even from Lourenco Marques and Gaza Provinces in the extreme south. They were all elected by their constituents, openly in the liberated areas and secretly in the zones still controlled by the Portuguese. This development of a popular base of power by FRELIMO is central to an understanding of the latest trends in Portugal's racist policies.

Faced by the organised power of the Mozambican people, Portuguese policy-makers have opted to work even more closely and openly with the Apartheid regime of the Republic of South Africa and with the illegal and racist white regime in Rhodesia. For decades, the cultural, social and economic discrimination which the Portuguese practised against the Africans in Mozambique amounted virtually to Apartheid. The Portuguese government usually sought to cover over this fact by legal niceties and empty phrases; but, whenever Mozambique was drawn into the orbit of South Africa and white-controlled Rhodesia, Portuguese pretensions about racial justice have given way to the overt practice of racial separation and the exploitation of the African people. As far back as 1951, the present Portuguese Prime Minister conceded that in Mozambique one noticed "some trace of racial separation... due to the influence of the Union of South Africa and Rhodesia". Not only has that influence grown steadily since 1951, but the Portuguese are now deliberately courting the favour of the South Africans and white Rhodesians in an attempt to counter FRELIMO's programme of freedom and equality. Consequently, even the superficial adherence to a non-racist policy on Portugal's part has now been replaced by the policy of extending Apartheid as a system.

Over the past two years, the Portuguese/South African alliance has clearly been cemented by top-level reciprocal visits. The latest of these was in June of this year, when Hildegard Muller, the South African Minister for Foreign Affairs, took a trip to Lisbon. That was a return

visit, complementary to the Portuguese delegation to South Africa in 1967 which was led by Franco Nogueira, Portugal's Foreign Minister. In addition, the South African Minister for Economic Affairs visited Portugal in November, 1967 to confer with his counterpart in the Portuguese government and with the Minister for Overseas Provinces (i.e. the Minister for the colonies). In March of this year, the South African Minister for Defence also visited Portugal in reply to the presence in South Africa in January of the Portuguese Defence Minister, General Sa'Viana Rebelo.

The communiques and speeches resulting from these visits make no secret of the mutual regard in which Portugal and the Republic of South Africa hold each other, nor do they hide their determination to collaborate to maintain the status quo in Southern Africa, along with White Rhodesia. At a press conference on the 30 August, 1967, the Portuguese Foreign Minister asserted that Southern Africa was a separate area distinct from the rest of the continent. Portugal and South Africa, he said, "not only had many interests and problems in common, but also shared the same system of values and were both equally determined to defend those values". They cynically refer to the maintenance of Apartheid and racism as the "defence of Western civilisation".

In the sphere of international relations, Portugal and South Africa work ever more closely as a pair to frustrate efforts such as those of the Commission on Human Rights, which in July of this year was refused access to those countries. However, by far the most important aspect of the joint defence of Apartheid by Portugal and South Africa is the military aspect - the consequences of which are being measured in terms of the blood and lives of Mozambicans.

Reliable sources have claimed that there is a specific tripartite military agreement between Portugal, South Africa and Rhodesia; although this has been denied by the parties in question. FRELIMO wishes to draw attention to the fact that if there is no treaty there is at least a strong military entente. South African Premier, Vorster, remarked that "We are good friends with Portugal and Rhodesia. Good friends do not need a pact. Good friends know what their duty is when a neighbour's house is on fire". It is therefore not in the least surprising that the Portuguese Defence Minister expressed his complete satisfaction with the talks which he held with the South African cabinet and with top military officials.

Military co-ordination between Portugal, South Africa and Rhodesia covers many spheres. Even before the Mozambican struggle for national independence took the form of armed operations under FRELIMO, South Africa and Portugal (along with the then British-administered Rhodesia) carried out

joint military exercises. In the latter part of 1960, e.g. there was a combined paratroop exercise by these three governments along the South African/Mozambique border. Since our national war was launched, Portugal has received support from other white racists in Southern Africa in four principal ways, as will be enumerated in the paragraphs below:

1. South Africa and Rhodesia have given Portugal civilian aid such as the Mozambique Soldiers Comfort Fund, which was set up under the patronage of Theo Gerdener, the Administrator of Natal. In November, 1967, South Africa offered through the Mozambique Soldiers Comfort Fund £2,500 worth of presents to Portuguese soldiers fighting in Mozambique.
2. There has been considerable joint planning and the exchange of military information. Portuguese soldiers are frequently on trips to Salisbury and Pretoria for discussions with their opposite numbers, and return visits are paid. When the Portuguese Brigadier Augusto de Jesus Remigio was leaving Mozambique for Portugal in March of this year, he was given a "send-off" party in Beira attended by the commander and other high-ranking officers of the 3rd battalion of the Rhodesian Armed Forces. Other significant visits to Mozambique connected with joint planning have been those carried out this year by South African military attaches in Lisbon and one by the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Defence in Rhodesia.
3. South Africa has made available to the Portuguese in Mozambique (and Angola) supplies and logistic support for waging their war of repression against our people. For instance, 27 aircraft come regularly from South Africa to drop high explosive bombs and napalm on Mozambican villages. In return the South African Air Force is allowed to fly its reconnaissance planes across Mozambique to violate the sovereignty and air-space of other independent African states while Portugal affords the South Africa armed forces the opportunity of studying the progress of our national war of liberation with a view to the development of counter-insurgency theories and tactics to be used against Africans fighting Apartheid in South Africa itself.
4. The culmination of the military agreements is in the direct intervention of South African forces in Mozambique. In January of this year, General C.A. Frazer, General Officer commanding South Africa's Joint Combat Forces, made a tour of inspection in Mozambique, accompanied by General Antonio Augusto dos Santos, Commander in chief of the Portuguese forces in Mozambique. This inspection tour was interpreted at the time as the prelude to direct South African

participation on the Portuguese side in the war in Mozambique, and since then that analysis has been justified. At the moment, there are South African military units stationed in Mozambique in battalion or company strength in at least four places - Chioco, Chic oa, Zumbo, Mague.

Several years ago, political analysts were commenting on South Africa's design to hold back the tide of African independence not just within her own boundaries, but at least as far as the Zambezi. Portugal's policy in Mozambique has shown that Portugal, too, is an active participant in this racist plot. On the economic front, the Lisbon authorities have encouraged every form of integration with the South African economy and that of Mozambique, including increased tourism, concessions for mineral exploration, more South African investment in Mozambique, and the integration of the infra-structure of roads and communications. The highlight of this economic policy is the giant Cahora Bassa dam which is planned on the Zambezi above Tete.

The contract to build the first stage of the Cahora Bassa dam was awarded to a consortium under the name of ZAMCO, which centres around the South African company, Anglo-American. The enterprise will be backed by a substantial loan from the South African government and by South African banks, apart from European financial interests. The major part of the dam's 3,600 megawatts of electrical power will be purchased by South Africa.

Cahora Bassa dam is not being built for the Africans of Mozambique. Its power will make South Africa industrially stronger, more equipped for repression and more capable of continuing its acquisition and manufacture of weapons for aggression against independent Africa (including nuclear weapons). Rhodesia too, will benefit, not only from cheap power, but also the opening up of navigation on the Zambezi, which is part of the project. Portugal has already been using Mozambique to make a mockery of the sanctions imposed on the white minority regime, and these two collaborators (Portugal and Rhodesia) have high hopes that the Cahora Bassa dam will further serve to thwart the just demands of the African people.

In the context of white co-operation in Southern Africa, there has been much talk of a Southern African Common Market; and the projected dam is meant to aid this. Needless to say, FRELIMO is not against technological progress and economic integration per se, but we are aware that these plans apply only to white residents and that they seek to maintain white domination in perpetuity. The Africans under Portuguese colonial rule are subject to be uprooted and separated from their families by thousands

of miles so as to provide cheap labour for South African mines. The Cahora Bassa scheme envisages the removal of all the African inhabitants from the Zambezi region, which is to be resettled by a million whites. It is a long-term plan which cynically calculates that by 1990 the Zambezi, as a totally white area, would be a buffer against African freedom.

In the short run, Cahora Bassa is also associated with the presence of South African troops on Mozambican soil, for it is no accident that those troops are stationed mainly in Tete province in and around the site chosen for the dam. Those South African troops are there because FRELIMO has extended its military operations to Tete, and is dealing blows at the Portuguese.

Apart from the direct connections between Portugal and South Africa, there are other ways through which Mozambique is drawn into the orbit of South Africa. These indirect channels are provided by NATO. On previous occasions, it has been drawn to the attention of the U.N. that members of NATO were continuing to supply to Portugal arms used to suppress the African people of Mozambique, Angola and Guinea (Bissau). In addition, some NATO members pursue policies which draw South Africa and Portugal closer together, with consequent strengthening of the white racist position. That is true of Britain, the USA and especially of West Germany in recent times, since West German capital is interested in the penetration of Southern Africa as a whole.

The above evidence can be summarised very briefly. Portugal is forging close diplomatic, political, economic and military ties with South Africa for the purpose of indefinitely maintaining white racism and supremacy throughout Southern Africa. FRELIMO is presenting these facts so that there will be no illusions anywhere that there have been any recent changes in the racist nature of Portugal's colonial policies. But, of course, it is the African people of Mozambique, Angola, Zimbabwe, South Africa and Namibia who are now confronting Apartheid and oppression with gun in hand. That is why we stress that the central fact of the situation in Mozambique is that its own population, under the leadership of FRELIMO is slowly but constantly gaining ground and has succeeded in establishing a counter-weight to Portuguese power.

We suggest that in our relationship with the U.N. and its various affiliates a new perspective has been opened. We continue to respect international public opinion (unlike Portugal) but it is no longer enough for that sympathetic opinion to condemn Portugal and go no further. It must identify itself positively and practically with our national movement which represents the very opposite of Portuguese bigotry and racism.

In conclusion, we should like to remind members of the Commission of the requests which FRELIMO has made to the U.N. as the consequence of the growth of our popular power and the proven fact that FRELIMO is representative of the African people of Mozambique. Our spokesman urged in November, 1967 that FRELIMO be considered the only representative of the people of Mozambique before the U.N. and that all communications with our people must be made through FRELIMO and not through the government of Portugal. FRELIMO is the organisation which has the right to receive the assistance of the U.N. in the name of Mozambique. We do not simply proclaim that right: we have earned it through the shedding of our blood and countless other sacrifices.

The U.N. Seminar in Zambia (August, 1967) had recommended that a fund be established to aid the liberated zones of southern Africa. In Mozambique this fund would be established under the control and supervision of FRELIMO and would be supported by the U.N., governments and private institutions. The purpose was to assist FRELIMO in national reconstruction and development, notably with respect to agriculture, cottage industries, trade, public health and education. FRELIMO's Second Congress of July last year has already laid the basis for more co-ordinated efforts towards national reconstruction, and this has led to the establishment of a Special Reconstruction Project, 1969. This project requires an initial outlay of shs. 1,188,100 with the intention that, after this capital outlay is met, the programme will be self-sustaining and self-propelling in terms of financing for the next two or three years. That is the framework within which FRELIMO is soliciting aid on behalf of the fighting people of Mozambique in the battle against Apartheid and for the creation of a new life.

(Statement presented to the U.N. Special Sub-Committee on Apartheid)
Dar es Salaam,
21 August, 1969.

THE RACISTS

If the Luso-Brazilian bloc has only started to take shape, the alliance between Portugal and South Africa has been, for many years, a gruesome reality.

Last May a South African trade mission visited Angola, where an exhibition of South African products was being held (*P.J.* 28.5.69).

An exhibition of military equipment captured by the Portuguese troops fighting African nationalists was held in Cape Town. It was sponsored by 'The Mozambique and Angola Soldiers Comfort Fund'. This organization collected another £20,000 for gifts for the Portuguese troops (*P.J.* 28.5.69).

The Governor-General of Angola declared that South Africa is welcome to contribute towards Angola's 'development', both with finance and equipment. Therefore, even though the trade balance is negative, Angola should continue encouraging the import of South African products (*P.J.* 6.6.69).

The South African Foreign Minister has been in Lisbon on an official visit. He met the Portuguese Prime Minister and Foreign Minister to 'attempt to solve some common problems and to plan how to face battles ahead' (*D.L.* 15.6.69).

Under the heading 'S. Africans Consulting Lisbon and London', the *London Times* recently gave unusual prominence to the South African Foreign Minister's visit to Lisbon. According to this newspaper, one of the topics under discussion is likely to have been a South African-Portuguese joint view on the Rhodesian referendum. Mr. Muller, the South African Foreign Secretary, declared that his country was 'filling the power vacuum in the Indian Ocean as the result of Britain's decision to withdraw her forces east of Suez' (*The Times*, 11.6.69).

The South African Vice-President of the Senate, Mr. P. Malan, has been appointed to the newly-created position of Consul-General in Angola (*P.J.* 17.6.69).

EXTRAORDINARY EXPENSES

In the 1969 Portuguese budget the ordinary expenses will amount to £218 million and extraordinary expenses to £143 million.

Forty-five per cent of the ordinary expenses (£159 million) were used for repression and the Army in 1968.

From the extraordinary expenses for 1969 a total of £91 million or 63 per cent of the total will be used in the colonial wars, in repression and in agreement with Portugal's NATO membership. Spending is as follows:

	£
To comply with international agreements ...	3,100,000
Military forces in the colonies ...	57,100,000
Extra for re-equipment of the Army and Air Force ...	14,300,000
Buying 3 escort vessels and 4 submarines (Partial payment) ...	7,400,000
Buying 6 corvettes (Partial payment) ...	1,300,000
Navy installations ...	1,700,000
NATO installations ...	1,600,000
Building of 6 escort vessels ...	400,000
West German Beja air base ...	1,300,000
Enlargement of the Air Force factory ...	1,400,000
To comply with agreement with France ...	400,000
Evora Communications Centre ...	300,000
Public Security ...	100,000

All this in a country which has the lowest standards of living and health in Europe.

~~Caetano-Nixon Collusion~~

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1-4 MFRS Part N 30 E01-1-A
Bendix Aviation Corporation Eclips
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The above were the markings on the "Portuguese" plane shot down by FRELIMO fighters in Mozambique after it had been bombing villages with napalm. Such material evidence should leave no one in doubt as to whether Portuguese NATO allies are in fact supporting the colonial wars.

With new leaders in both countries, all the indications are that even closer economic and military ties between Portugal and the United States are to be anticipated. Apart from the close personal friendship between Nixon and Caetano, the most important factor is Portugal's strategic position for the location of American bases. The importance of the Azores Base is proving a trump card for the Portuguese militarists, particularly at a time when Spain's financial demands may force the closure of American bases there. Portugal has indicated that she would welcome the transfer of these bases - on certain conditions. An article in South Africa's Johannesburg "Star" of November 23, 1968 stated that Portugal had asked for American support, or at least neutrality vis-a-vis her African wars, as a condition for the continued use of the Azores and in addition would welcome the U.S. transfer of her Spain bases if the U.S. provided "some form of material support for Portugal's wars in Africa, together with industrial investment at home".

Moreover, the Azores base has become even more important because the Americans have extended and deepened the harbour of Vila da Praia da Vitoria several miles away in order to establish a base there for polaris submarines instead of in ROTA (Spain).

It seems rather significant that as soon as CAetano came to power negotiations on the Azores base were reopened at his request - in order to obtain more assistance for the colonial wars. In exchange for an extension of the Azores treaty, Portugal is said to have demanded \$ 200 million worth of arms to be supplied in five years.

At the present time both parties are still negotiating.

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caetano gives

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